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The B a lk ans
R AY M ON D D E T R E Z
In the Balkans, religion seems to have played a much
more important role in the process of nation building
than language. Speakers of Serbo-Croat fell apart in
three national communities on the basis of religion.
Thus emerged the Bosniak nation, which identifies it-
self with Islam and clearly distinguishes itself from
the Catholic Croats and the Orthodox Serbs. The es-
tablishment of the national states in the Balkans was
accompanied, from the beginning of the 19t h c e n t u-
ry, by attempts to restore the pre-Ottoman Christian
states. The population was ethnically homogenized
by expelling ethnic and religious minorities or by
forcibly assimilating them. In particular the Muslims
in the Balkans, and especially the Muslim Turks, fell
victim to this policy.
Religion 
and Nationhood
in the Balkans
It is generally assumed that in the Balkans,
religion Ð including Islam Ð rather than lan-
guage, plays a decisive role in the process of
nation building. The former Yugoslavia is a
case in point. In the central part of the east-
ern Balkans, where the former Yugoslavia
was situated, a South Slavic language is spo-
ken which used to be called Serbo-Croat or
Croato-Serb until recent times. In the 19t h
century, the very similar dialects of Serbo-
Croat were standardized into one single lit-
erary language, intended to demonstrate
the ÔonenessÕ of the Yugoslav or South Slav-
ic nation v i s -  - v i s its many enemies (Ger-
mans, Hungarians, Turks).
In the same period, however, within the
community of speakers of Serbo-Croat, na-
tional identities began developing on the
basis of religion; or rather, national commu-
nities emerged, coinciding greatly with reli-
gious communities. Catholics speaking
Serbo-Croat, living in the Habsburg Empire,
identified themselves as Croats, whereas
the Orthodox speakers of Serbo-Croat, liv-
ing scattered over the Habsburg and the Ot-
toman Empires and in their own principality
of Serbia, considered themselves Serbs. The
development of a Bosnian national con-
sciousness among the Muslim speakers of
Serbo-Croat was slightly retarded, due to
the SerbsÕ and CroatsÕ attempts to incorpo-
rate them at least conceptually in their own
respective national communities as Serb or
Croat Muslims, and to the fact that belong-
ing to the Muslim community traditionally
was far more important to the Bosnians
than belonging to one or another national
community. The Yugoslav nationalists, en-
deavouring to create a single Yugoslav na-
tion, tended to minimize the religious differ-
ences among Bosnians, Croats and Serbs, as
they thwarted the process of South Slavic
u n i f i c a t i o n .
In the 20t h century, however, especially
after the establishment of the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 (re-
named Yugoslavia in 1929), as a result of the
Serbs monopolizing political and military
power in the new state, Croats started dis-
tancing themselves from the idea of a sin-
gle, South Slavic nation and state and devel-
oped a national identity of their own, em-
phasizing the particularities of the Croat
language and the Catholic faith as distinc-
tive features of the Croat nation v i s -  - v i s t h e
Serbs. After an abortive and rather compro-
mising attempt to establish an independent
Croat state under Nazi protection during
the Second World War, Croatia was re-inte-
grated into Yugoslavia, which had become a
communist federal state in 1944. The Croats
finally achieved their aim in 1991, when the
Republic of Croatia was internationally rec-
o g n i z e d .
Bosnian nationhood
In post-war Yugoslavia, the formation of a
Bosnian national consciousness was finally
completed. The official recognition of Bosn-
ian nationhood in 1969 Ð under the clumsy
denomination ÔMuslims in the ethnic sense
of the wordÕ Ð resulted mainly from the
need for a national community whose rep-
resentatives would balance Croat sepa-
ratism and Serb hegemonism at the level of
the federal government and of the govern-
ment of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegov-
ina. This does not mean, however, that the
Bosnian nation was an artificial creation.
The Bosnians constituted already then a
very distinct national community, defining
itself through Islam, just as Croats and Serbs
defined themselves through Catholicism
and Orthodoxy respectively. In fact, the very
insistence of Croats and Serbs on religious
affiliation as a basic component of national
identity had largely contributed to prevent-
ing the Bosniaks from considering them-
selves Muslim Serbs or Croats, as both Serbs
and Croats indefatigably attempted to
make the Bosnians believe. How could a
Muslim be a Serb, if being Orthodox is fun-
damental to being Serb? Besides, just as
Croats think of their nation as a part of West
European civilization and Serbs have the
sense of belonging to Slavic Orthodox East-
ern Europe, the Bosnians consider their na-
tion a full member of the large family of Is-
lamic peoples with their own age-old and
rich cultural traditions, which are an integral
part of the Bosnian national identity.
To be sure, in the Balkans, religion in gen-
eral has little to do with devoutness. Forty
years of communist rule dramatically re-
duced church and mosque attendance. The
religious revival of the last decade is mainly
the result of the peopleÕs desire to express
their belonging to an ethnic or national
community. As religion is the basic compo-
nent of national identity, church and
mosque attendance appears to be a demon-
stration of national awareness. Of course,
the clergy (be it Catholic, Orthodox or Mus-
lim) has seized the opportunity to strength-
en its position in society and to acquire a
more or less official ÔnationalÕ status. This
may Ð and often does Ð threaten the secular
character of the state granted by the Consti-
tution. It has, however, less to do with reli-
gious fanaticism than with nationalist fa-
naticism. This goes for Bosnians, Croats and
Serbs alike.
National and religious
i d e n t i t y
The identification of national and reli-
gious identity (in the sense of belonging to
a religious community) is the least articulat-
ed with the Bosnians. The same phenome-
non can be observed with the other Muslim
communities in the Balkans. The Pomaks
(Bulgarian Muslims) in the Rhodope moun-
tains in Southern Bulgaria, in spite of their
being linguistically related to the Bulgari-
ans, seem to associate more with the Turk-
ish minority in Bulgaria than with the major-
ity of Orthodox Bulgarians. Here, religion is
apparently a stronger uniting factor than
language. In Greece too, the Pomak minori-
ty is steadily absorbed by the Greek Turks,
notwithstanding the attempts of the Greek
authorities to impose upon them a Pomak
consciousness, separate from the Turkish
(and Bulgarian).
The identification of national and religious
identity is the strongest with the Orthodox
nations in the Balkans Ð Bulgarians, Greeks,
Macedonians, and Serbs. This is the result of
the Byzantine legacy of ÔnationalÕ churches.
Nation, state, religious community and ec-
clesiastical organization are supposed to be
congruent. The Bulgarian Constitution
states that Orthodox Christianity is the tra-
ditional religion of the Bulgarian people; the
Greek Constitution is promulgated in the
name of the Holy Trinity. Consequently,
non-orthodox minorities Ð Muslim Pomaks
and Turks, but also Catholics and Protes-
tants Ð are considered, sometimes quite ex-
plicitly, as ÔdefectiveÕ Bulgarians, Greeks or,
for that matter, Macedonians and Serbs, and
as a threat to national unity and solidarity.
The identification of national and reli-
gious community has determined the atti-
tude of the Orthodox peoples in the Balkans
towards Islam in yet another way. In the 19t h
century, urged by nationalism, the Balkan
peoples began their struggle for national in-
dependence against the Ottoman domina-
tion, established at the end of the 14t h a n d
during the 15t h century. Independence was
perceived by the leaders of the respective
independence movements as the restora-
tion of the former mediaeval, pre-Ottoman
states. Since the mediaeval Balkan states re-
peatedly went through periods of imperial
growth and feudal disintegration, the bor-
ders were not very well defined. As a rule,
every national community aimed at the re-
establishment of its respective mediaeval
state at its maximum size Ð which resulted
in legion territorial overlappings and border
conflicts. In addition to the former size, the
Balkan peoples also wanted to restore the
ethnic composition of the population of
their former states. As religion was one of
the main distinctive features of national
identity, the former religious community
was to be restored as well. In contrast to his-
torical evidence, the population of the
Balkan mediaeval states was perceived by
the 19t h-century Balkan nationalists as eth-
nically and religiously homogeneous.
Thus, in order to re-establish the mediae-
val situation, ethnic and religious minorities
that came into being after the Ottoman con-
quest had to be eliminated. In some in-
stances, the identity of these minorities was
ÔreconstructedÕ in such a way that they
could be incorporated in and consequently
assimilated by the majority. The Greeks la-
belled their Slavic co-religionists (about
150,000 people) in Greek Macedonia as
ÔSlavophone GreeksÕ and have been treating
them as ethnic Greeks ever since. The Turks
in Greece too are officially called ÔGreek
MuslimsÕ. Calling them Turks is punishable.
An attempt to ÔreconstructÕ the Bosnians as
Islamicized Serbs or Croats failed. For the
time being, Bulgarians have been more suc-
cessful in preventing the Pomaks from de-
veloping a separate Pomak national con-
sciousness Ð though they have been help-
ing them by explicitly identifying Bulgarian-
hood and orthodoxy.
The main victims of the Balkan ChristiansÕ
endeavours to restore their mediaeval
states are those communities that differ
both ethnically and religiously from the ma-
jority: the Turks and the Kosovars, being nei-
ther Slavs, Greeks, nor Orthodox Christians.
As Islam was introduced in the Balkans
mainly as a result of the Ottoman conquest,
there was no place for Albanian and Turkish
Muslims in the restored Christian Balkan
states. As the double barrier of ethnic and
religious ÔothernessÕ made it impossible to
reconstruct their national identity in a way
to make them Ð albeit conceptually Ð disap-
pear into the majority, more radical ways to
eliminate them had to be resorted to. All in-
dependence wars in the Balkans (the Serb
Uprisings in 1804-30, the Greek War of Inde-
pendence in 1821-30, and the Russian-Ot-
toman War in 1877-8) were accompanied by
massacring and expelling not only the Ot-
toman officials and military, but also the
Muslim Turkish population. During the First
Balkan War in 1912, not only Turks but also
Albanians fell victim. The ethnic cleansing of
Bosnians in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo
is a resumption of this ÔmethodÕ of nation
building in the late 20t h c e n t u r y .
Having lost most of its non-Turkish and
non-Muslim populations, the late Ottoman
Empire and the subsequent Turkish Repub-
lic resorted to similar practices in order to
ultimately create a homogeneous Turkish
state. The treatment of the Armenians,
Greeks and Kurds in Anatolia are the most
notorious of these measures. However, the
identification of nationhood and religious
affiliation is less apparent in the official
Turkish (Kemalist) interpretation of national
identity than it is in the Christian Balkan
c o u n t r i e s . '
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